

**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**  
**Steering Group on Monitoring Strategic Arms Reductions**

ACIS - 1506/87  
8 December 1987

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Senior Arms Control Group**

**FROM:**

[redacted]  
Chairman, Strategic Arms Monitoring Working Group

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**SUBJECT:**

Assessment of Soviet INF Data [redacted]

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Summary

1. This memorandum provides the Intelligence Community's coordinated assessment of the INF data presented by the Soviets to the US Delegation, as required by the Draft INF Treaty. The data were received primarily in three major exchanges, the last exchange occurring on 2 December and consisting of diagrams of "declared facilities." It now appears to be virtually complete and is internally consistent. Overall, the Soviet data generally falls within the range of Intelligence Community estimates, although it falls substantially short of the DIA estimate of total Soviet SS-20 missile inventory (see paragraph 3 for further discussion). However, there are some discrepancies with declared locations. Most importantly, a number of facilities, with both a historical and recent association with the storage of [redacted] equipment, have not been listed by the Soviets. Although we are uncertain of the current status of the historically associated facilities, we judge their exclusion, in large part, to be the result of recent and continuing consolidation of this equipment into "declared facilities" to reduce the number of facilities that would be subject to on-site inspection by the US. Such consolidation of treaty-limited items is not prohibited. There are a few other facilities for which we have recent association which have not been listed by the Soviets. [redacted]

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Types of Data

2. The INF Draft Treaty requires both the Soviets and the US to provide specific data--in the form of a "Memorandum of Understanding"--about the missile systems being eliminated. By 4 December, with minor exceptions, the Soviets had provided the required aggregated and disaggregated data on deployed and non-deployed missiles, launchers, and other associated equipment covered by the Treaty. (Missing from the disaggregated numbers was one previously-declared missile launcher--most likely an inadvertent deletion by the Soviets.) The Soviets have provided all other required data. [redacted]

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### Force Levels

#### 3. The Soviet data generally fall within the range of Intelligence Community estimates:

- The Soviet data on shorter-range missiles (the Soviets have claimed [ ] deployed and non-deployed SS-12 and SS-23 missiles) is very close to our estimates [ ] 25X1  
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- For the intermediate-range missiles, the number of SS-4 missiles [ ] appears reasonable. (Production of this system ended in 1962, and there is no reasonable basis for estimating the inventory.) 25X1
- The SS-20 total [ ] is higher than the State/INR [ ] and CIA [ ] estimates. However, the total is short of DIA's estimate [ ] which is based on their judgment that the Soviets produced an extra refire missile for each deployed launcher. Based on this position, (and the range of uncertainties that are a part of this estimate), DIA believes that there are at least [ ] perhaps as many as [ ] SS-20 missiles not accounted for in the Soviet data. 25X1  
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4. In the three major data exchanges, the number of treaty-limited items within the Soviets "deployed" and "non-deployed" categories changed, probably due to the strict application of relevant Treaty definitions. For example, between the first and second exchanges, the Soviets switched [ ] shorter-ranged missiles from the non-deployed to the deployed category. With the third exchange, the numbers of intermediate-range missiles also changed for both deployed and non-deployed missiles and launchers due to recategorization and additional numbers provided. In the case of the non-deployed IRMs (which dropped [ ]), some [ ] SS-20 and [ ] SS-4 missiles were discounted because they were listed as "training missiles" which the Soviets had claimed they incorrectly included in their previous totals for non-deployed missiles. At the same time, the Soviets added [ ] SRM training missiles without adjusting the previous non-deployed total. 25X1  
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- It should be noted that the Intelligence Community is not certain as to the Soviet criteria for differentiating training missiles from actual missiles.
- It is unclear whether such training missiles are distinguishable from actual missiles, although they are subject to elimination procedures. [ ] 25X1

5. The Soviet launcher totals are within Intelligence Community estimates for the SS-4, SS-12, and SS-20. The Soviet total for SS-23 launchers, however, exceeds our estimates--primarily because the system is in the early stages of deployment, and the Intelligence Community has a limited data base. The Intelligence Community's estimates of Soviet resupply vehicles are varied. The number of SS-12 resupply vehicles was well below the assessed

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numbers, whereas the number of SS-20 resupply vehicles was well above.

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6. Of particular note, the Soviets provided data on the number and location of their ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM)--claiming [ ] missiles and [ ] launchers at a deactivated SS-4 launch site. Because the Soviet GLCM has been tested but never deployed, the Intelligence Community does not have an accurate estimate of the number of ground-launched cruise missiles and launchers that may exist.

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### Locational Data

7. The "declared" locations of the deployed and non-deployed treaty-limited items can be addressed in three general categories: missile operating bases, missile support facilities, and designated elimination facilities. While most of the "declared" facilities previously had either a known or suspect association with INF systems [ ]

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8. Missile Operating Bases. The Soviets declared--either in the list of facilities or in the site diagrams--the missile operating bases that the US assesses as having deployed treaty-limited items for each system. In some cases, most notable with shorter-range systems, the number of missiles and launchers were higher than estimated, probably as a result of consolidation.

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9. Support Facilities. The "declared" support facilities include those for storage, repair, production, training, and testing. While the majority of these facilities are known, some are currently assessed as having a different function or system relationship.

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10. Elimination Facilities. The Soviets have declared missile and launcher elimination facilities for each system, including two facilities--

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which equate to known SS-20 field training areas--for SS-20 launch to destruction. [REDACTED]

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Soviet Facility Diagrams

11. Overall, the Soviet diagrams of the "declared facilities" are sufficient. However, they differ greatly in detail and completeness from location to location. [REDACTED]

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Soviet Technical Data


12. The Soviet-provided technical data on the INF systems is, with minor exceptions, very close to the Intelligence Community assessments. [REDACTED]

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**Attachment:  
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